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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Compulsory School Attendance-Who
Directs the Education of a Child? State v. Edgington

I. INTRODUCTION

State v. Edgington' determined that a New Mexico statute prohibiting
parental home instruction2 does not violate the equal protection clauses
of the federal and state constitutions. 3 A Socorro family had challenged
the statute's constitutionality on the grounds that it abridged their parental
right to direct the education of their children.4 The New Mexico Court
of Appeals, however, found that the statute was rationally related to state
interests in compulsory school attendance. 5 This Note examines the rationale and implications of the Edgington decision.

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

their children• in public
Don and Paula Edgington did not enroll
6
"/ schools
for the 1981-82 school year. Instead, they taught their twoschool-age
children at home, in contravention of a New Mexico statute that prohibits
parental home instruction. 7 After Socorro public school officials became
aware of the situation, the Edgingtons were convicted in Socorro County
I. State v. Edgington, 99 N.M. 715, 663 P.2d 374 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 644, 662
P.2d 645, cert. denied sub nom. Edgington v. New Mexico, 52 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Nov. 1, 1983)
(No. 83-5067).
2. N.M. Stat. Ann. §22-1-2(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1981) defines a private school for purposes of
fulfilling compulsory school attendance requirements set out in N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-1 to -7
(Cum. Supp. 1983).
3. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; N.M. Const. art. II, § 18.
4. 99 N.M. at 719, 663 P.2d at 378.
5. Id. at 719, 663 P.2d at 378.
6. Id. at 717, 663 P.2d at 376. The New Mexico Constitution requires every child of school age
and sufficient physical and mental ability to attend a public or "other" school as prescribed by law.
N.M. Const. art. XII, § 5. The state's Compulsory School Attendance Act prescribes the conditions
that fulfill the constitutional attendance requirement, including enumeration of what "other" types
of schools will satisfy the state. The Act provides that students must attend "a public school, private
school, or state institution" to comply with the law. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-2(A) (Cum. Supp.
1983).
7. Under the New Mexico Public School Code, a private school is defined as a school offering
programs of instruction "not under the control, supervision, or management of a local school board
exclusive of home instruction offered by the parent, guardian, or one having custody of the student"
(emphasis added). N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-1-2(1) (Repl. Parnp. 1981).
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Magistrate Court of violating the New Mexico Compulsory School Attendance Act. 8
The Edgingtons appealed their conviction to the Socorro County District Court. 9 The de novo review procedure" required a retrial of the
matter, giving rise to the Edgingtons' motion to dismiss the charges against
them." The Edgingtons asserted as grounds for dismissal, first, that their
children had attended school within the meaning of New Mexico's public
violated4
school law, 2 and second, that the home instruction prohibition
3
their federal and state rights to free exercise of religion, to privacy,'
and to equal protection of the laws.' 5
After an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the district court concluded
that the Edgingtons had provided their children with a supervised program
of instruction as required by state law.' 6 The court went on to hold that
the home instruction exception contained in New Mexico's private school
8. 99 N.M. at 716-17, 663 P.2d at 375-76. The Socorro school officials followed the procedures
imposed by state law, which required them, on learning of a violation of the state's attendance
policy, to serve notice of such violation on the parents or guardians of the truant child. N.M. Stat.
Ann. §22-12-7(B) (Cum. Supp. 1983). The Edgingtons were notified and consequently charged
under the state law providing that a parent or guardian who continues in violation of the Compulsory
School Attendance Act after such notice, whether by act or omission, is guilty of a petty misdemeanor.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-7(D) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
9. 99 N.M. at 717, 663 P.2d at 376.
10. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §35-13-2(A) (1978) (appeals from magistrate court shall be tried de
novo in district court).
11. Record of Evidentiary Hearing at 1, 99 N.M. 715, 663 P.2d 374 (Ct. App. 1983) [hereinafter
cited as Record]. The transcript is on file at the University of New Mexico Law Library.
12. The Edgingtons first argued that their children had attended school within the meaning of the
Public School Code, namely a "supervised program of instruction designed to educate a person in
a particular place, manner, and subject area." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-1-2(S) (Repl. Pamp. 1981);
Record at 50-52. This definition of a "school" and the definition of a "private school" provided by
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-1-2(I) offer different and potentially conflicting characterizations of a school.
See supra note 7.
In support of their argument, the Edgingtons offered evidence to the effect that Mrs. Edgington
had been the children's primary teacher, although both parents had supervised the children's instruction. They established that Mrs. Edgington had been certified as an elementary school teacher in
New Mexico between 1967 and 1978 and had taught for two and one-half years in the Socorro
Public Schools. She also was certified to teach by the state of Missouri during 1981-82. The
Edgingtons had implemented a curriculum provided for them by the Christian Liberty Academy of
Illinois.
The state challenged the motion to dismiss on grounds that, as applied to the Compulsory School
Attendance Act, the private school definition prohibited enrollment in a program of parentally
supervised home instruction from fulfilling the state's attendance requirement. See Record at 49-50.
13. U.S. Const. amend. I, §2; N.M. Const. art. 11, § 11. See also Record at 10-14.
14. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; N.M. Const. art. II, § 18. Specifically, the Edgingtons had
argued that their right to direct their children's education implicated privacy rights protected by
federal and state due process clauses. See Record at 10-14.
15. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; N.M. Const. art. 11,§ 18. See also Record at 10-14.
16. State v. Edgington, 99 N.M. 715, 717, 663 P.2d 374, 376 (Ct. App. 1983). See also supra
note 12.
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definition violated the equal protection clause. '"The district court invalidated the definition as "unreasonable, arbitrary, and [without] some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the objects
of the Public School Code."' 8 The state appealed the resulting dismissal
of the charges.' 9
The court of appeals reversed the district court's judgment and upheld
the constitutionality of the home instruction exception. The court remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the charges against the
Edgingtons. 20
The court of appeals in Edgington based its holding on a four-point
rationale. First, rather than focusing on the Edgingtons' assertion of their
parental right to direct their children's education, the court reframed their
equal protection claim in terms of the children's right to receive an
education. Relying on the United States Supreme Court decision in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,2' the court of appeals
found that a child's right to an education was not fundamental, and thus
did not trigger strict judicial scrutiny of the statutory classification embodied in the home instruction exception.22
Second, the Edgington court rephrased the rational basis test articulated
by the district court.23 The court of appeals' test would sustain a statutory
17. 99 N.M. at 717, 663 P.2d at 376. The district court accepted the Edgingtons' contention that,
in light of Santa Fe Community School v. New Mexico State Bd. of Educ., 85 N.M. 783, 518 P.2d
272 (1974), the state could no longer compel any program of state supervised instruction in private
schools. Santa Fe, together with the district court's finding that the Edgingtons had provided a
supervised program of instruction, set up the Edgingtons' argument that, as applied to them, the
home instruction exception to the private school definition was arbitrary and unreasonable.
18. 99 N.M. at 717, 663 P.2d at 376. The district court did not reach the Edgingtons' free exercise
and due process claims because it found that the private school definition violated the Edgingtons'
equal protection rights. Consequently, these issues were not considered on appeal. Id. at 718, 663
P.2d at 377.
19. Id. at 717, 663 P.2d at 376.
20. Id. at 720, 663 P.2d at 379.
21. 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973). Rodriguez involved an equal protection challenge to the Texas funding
formula for public education. The formula netted unequal school district revenues based, in part,
on differences in property tax incomes. The Court implied that students might have a fundamental
right to an education providing "basic minimal skills." Id. Nonetheless, the Court found a lower
court's conclusion that education was a fundamental right "unpersuasive" and applied the rational
basis test to the statutory scheme at issue. It was this language from Rodriguez that persuaded the
Edgington court that education is not a fundamental right. 99 N.M. at 718, 663 P.2d at 377.
The Rodriguez Court also had suggested that legislation aimed at denial of the free exercise of a
constitutionally protected right might merit more intense scrutiny, 411 U.S. at 37-38, but the Edgington court did not pursue this line of inquiry. The important distinction, however, is that Rodriguez
did not involve parental rights regarding children's education, the central issue raised by the Edgingtons.
22. 99 N.M. at 718, 663 P.2d at 377. The question whether a parent's right to direct a child's
education is fundamental, thereby triggering strict scrutiny, is discussed infra at note 34.
23. See supra text accompanying note 18.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

classification 2whenever
"any state of facts may be reasonably conceived
4
to justify it."
Third, the court of appeals identified two "reasonably conceived" state
interests, which it inferred from the legislative origins of the home instruction exception:25 (1) prevention of parentally approved truancy, and
(2) supervision of the child's educational development by someone other
than a parent. 26 Finally, the court found that the home instruction exception
was rationally related to these legitimate state interests, and thus did not
violate the Edgingtons' equal protection rights .27
1II. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
State v. Edgington establishes that parents may not choose to educate
their own children at home, no matter how educationally sound the curriculum and the teaching methods employed. The court of appeals reached
this conclusion notwithstanding its recognition of the contradictory effect

8
of Santa Fe Community School v. New Mexico State Board of Education,229

which permits parents to send children to an unregulated private school.
Close examination of the four points of the court's rationale in Edgington suggests that this anomalous result is unjustified. As analysis of

24. 99 N.M. at 718, 663 P.2d at 377.
25. Id. at 719, 663 P.2d at 378. The private school definition, including the home instruction
exception, was drafted in 1975 in order to align New Mexico school law with the New Mexico
Supreme Court decision in Santa Fe Community School v. New Mexico State Bd. of Educ., holding
state supervision, management, and control of nonpublic schools unconstitutional. 85 N.M. at 783,
518 P.2d at 272. The State Department of Education [hereinafter cited as State Department] created
the Task Force for Nonpublic Schools subsequent to the Santa Fe decision. The Task Force was to
determine the nature and extent of the state's constitutional authority to approve private school
courses of instruction, pursuant to meeting requirements of the Compulsory School Attendance Act.
Position Paper of the Task Force For Nonpublic Schools at 1-2 (appended to Record).
The Task Force initially determined that the most desirable means to reconcile the respective
interests of parent, child, and state lay in abolishing the compulsory attendance requirement. Position
Paper at 2. Inasmuch as this approach entailed an amendment to the New Mexico Constitution,
however, the Task Force agreed upon a less drastic amendment to the Public School Code, calling
for state deregulation of nonpublic schools. Id. The Code was revised accordingly. See 1975 N.M.
Laws ch. 332, § I, currently codified in N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-1-2(l) (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
The home instruction exception apparently was an afterthought, given the concern in "many
circles, i.e. [sic] that anyone could keep his children home and call it a private school." Task Force
Letter, Dec. 30, 1974, accompanying final draft of the Task Force's proposed legislation (appended
to Record). As a result of this concern, the revised statute permits student attendance at a "private"
school with no supervised program of instruction to meet the compulsory attendance requirement,
although a "supervised program of instruction," such as the district court found the Edgingtons
provided at home, is not deemed sufficient under the statute.
26. 99 N.M. at 719, 663 P.2d at 378.
27. Id.
28. 85 N.M. 783, 518 P.2d 272 (1974).
29. See Record at 20: "No private school in New Mexico is compelled to seek State accreditation
or receive State approval of its programs, its curriculum or its instructor qualifications to operate
legally." See also supra note 25 for a discussion of the deregulation of nonpublic education in New
Mexico.
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the court's reasoning reveals, the court intended to defer to its perception
of the policy decision underlying the Legislature's prohibition of home
instruction. Its/method of scrutiny failed to uncover, however, the mistaken assumption behind the legislative policy. Indeed, the home instruction exception to the definition of a private school can only be sustained
if one accepts the validity of this assumption, namely, that parental decisions are invariably adverse to the educational interests of their children.
A. The Home Instruction Exception: The Court's Rationale
1. The Court's Characterization of the Affected Rights
The Edgingtons had characterized the appeal in terms of their parental
rights, 3" and the district court had based its equal protection conclusion
on the inconsistent effect of the private school definition upon parental
rights.3 ' The court of appeals, however, reframed this issue, ignoring the
parental rights question and focusing instead on the educational rights of
the children.32
This shift in focus had noteworthy ramifications for the Edgington
court's decision. The Edgingtons had asserted their parental rights on
both due process and equal protection grounds,33 arguing that the right
to direct their children's education' implicated fundamental privacy rights35
30. State v. Edgington, 99 N.M. 715, 717, 663 P.2d 374, 376 (Ct. App. 1983).
31. See Record at 316.
32. See 99 N.M. at 718, 663 P.2d at 377. The court's decision to focus on the right of the child,
rather than that of the parent, is never explicitly articulated. The citation of San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra note 21, however, can only be explained as manifesting the court's
decision to resolve the case by balancing the rights of children against the state's interests. For a
further discussion of Rodriguez, see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
33. 99 N.M. at 717, 663 P.2d at 376. The state appealed solely on the grounds that the home
instruction exception did not violate the Edgingtons' equal protection rights. In response, the Edgingtons asserted both substantive due process and equal protection claims. They argued that the
statute violated both their first amendment right to the free exercise of religion and their fourteenth
amendment right to privacy, manifested as the parental right to direct their children's education.
They likewise claimed that the statutory classification in question discriminated against their exercise
of the previously asserted fundamental rights, thereby denying them the equal protection of the laws.
For a discussion of whether the parental right may be viewed as fundamental, see infra notes 3435.
34. Inasmuch as the court of appeals declined to consider the constitutional scope of the parental
right, we have no insight as to the court's perception of this question. The court's reluctance to
consider such a question is understandable, if unfortunate. United States Supreme Court case law
has discussed the possible scope of the parental right, but has reached no strong conclusion on the
subject.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), enumerated the freedom to raise children as among
the liberty interests protected by the fourteenth amendment. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925), amplified Meyer by holding that parents had the constitutionally protected right, subject
to reasonable state regulation, to direct the upbringing and education of children under one's control.
Id. at 534-35. The Pierce Court further described the theory encompassing the right as one which
excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing
them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere
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and mandated strict judicial scrutiny of the statutory scheme.36 The court's
decision to ignore the parental rights issue left unresolved the Edgingtons'
asserted parental rights claims.
Furthermore, the court's reformulation of the issue settled the question
of the level of judicial scrutiny applicable to the home instruction excreature of the state. Those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
Id.
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), likewise recognized the existence of the
parental right, describing a "private realm of family life which the state cannot enter." The Prince
Court held, however, that the state's legitimate need to protect the welfare of children overcame
claims of both parental and free exercise rights. Id.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), a case somewhat analogous to Edgington, presented
the combined free exercise and parental rights claims of a group of Old Order Amish parents who
refused to send their children to high school. The Court upheld the parents' first and fourteenth
amendment rights to direct the religious training of their children. Id. at 234. The Court treated the
combination of first and fourteenth amendment claims as implicating fundamental rights and triggering
strict judicial scrutiny of Wisconsin's school attendance laws. Id. at 233. Read together, Prince and
Yoder suggest that a combined parental right/free exercise claim, such as the Edgingtons', might be
deemed fundamental if the claimants established an essential link between their religious beliefs and
nonattendance at conventional schools. Yet, even a claim of fundamental stature may not prevail
against sufficiently compelling state interests in child welfare. See infra note 36 for a discussion of
standards of constitutional analysis. Moreover, it is unclear whether the Court would accord fundamental status to a purely secular parental rights claim.
35. No United States Supreme Court case explicitly identifies a parent's right to direct his child's
education as a valid manifestation of the constitutionally protected, fundamental right to privacy.
Language in the seminal privacy cases, however, suggests that this parental right is a protected
expression of family autonomy, one of the valid characterizations of the right to privacy. Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), describes parental decisions regarding children's education as
protected by the fundamental constitutional guarantees creating a zone of privacy around certain
rights. Id. at 482-84. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973), cited with approval the Griswold
language describing constitutionally protected zones of privacy surrounding fundamental personal
rights. Furthermore, the Roe Court described such fundamental rights as "hav[ing] some extension
to activities relating to family relationships (citing Prince); and child rearing and education (citing
Meyer and Pierce). Id. Roe makes clear, however, that even fundamental privacy rights may be
limited by legislation narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests with which the rights
conflict. Id. at 153-54. Cf. Rodriguez, supra note 21, at 32-33, stating that only rights explicitly or
implicitly included within the Constitution will be deemed fundamental.
36. Judicial review of both due process and equal protection claims takes the general form of a
balancing process that weighs individual rights against both state interests and the legislative means
for furthering those interests. The balancing process strives to guarantee effective implementation
of legislative purpose without undue infringement of personal rights. Yet, courts will weight the
balance in favor of either the individual or the state, depending upon the nature of the right or
classification burdened by the legislation. Thus, the balancing process requires an initial identification
of the right or the class burdened by the legislation. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 15256 (1973).
Typically, legislation burdening social or economic interests of a class will be weighted in favor
of the state's regulatory interests and presumed valid unless the legislation has no rational relationship
to a state goal. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 (1982). On the other hand, when a
fundamental individual right or suspect classification of persons is burdened, the balance shifts in
favor of the individual. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). This so-called
strict judicial scrutiny presumes the challenged legislation unconstitutional unless the state can
demonstrate that the statute is narrowly tailored or necessary to the furtherance of a compelling state
interest. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
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ception. As the Edgington court stated, the Rodriguez holding that education is not a fundamental right allowed the court of appeals to apply a
rational basis test to the challenged statutory classification. 37 Application
of that standard requires less scrutiny by the court and usually results in
the vindication of the statute.38 Thus, by applying Rodriguez and treating
the case as a children's rights case, the Edgington court effectively weighted
its analysis in the state's favor.
2. The Court's Reformulation of the Rational Basis Test
The district court's order to dismiss the charges against the Edgingtons
set out as its standard of review a requirement that the challenged classification bear a "fair and substantial relationship" 39 to a legislative purpose. This test arguably subjected the home instruction exception to more
substantial scrutiny than the rational basis test, in view of the perceived
importance of the parental right.' The court of appeals reformulated this
test, however, to inquire only as to the existence of any conceivable state
of facts that would justify the statutory classification embodied in the
home instruction exception.41 The Edgington court's articulation of the
test reflects its decision to forego scrutiny of the rationality of the home
instruction exception, based on its expressed policy of extreme judicial
deference to legislative classifications.42
The court of appeals emphasized a three-fold concern with legislative
ends. First, it implied that the rational basis test does not require assertion
of actual state interests. Instead, the statute was to have been scrutinized
in light of any conceivable state interests that the court could have identified.43 Second, the court required only a minimal showing regarding the
legitimacy of identified state interests. The court stated that a legislative
purpose will be found to be legitimate if any reasonably conceived state
37. 99 N.M. at 718, 663 P.2d at 377.
38. See G. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search Of Evolving Equal
Protection Doctrine On A Changing Court: A Model For A Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L.
Rev. 1,8 (1972). But see Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982), in which the Court struck down
an Alaska statute on rational basis grounds.
39. The Edgington court's standard of review contrasts sharply with the rational basis test set out
in the district court's order to dismiss the charges against the Edgingtons. The court's order described
the home instruction exception as "unreasonable, arbitrary, and [without] some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relationship to the objects of the Public School Code." 99 N.M. at
717, 663 P.2d at 376.
40. This approach required both a rational and substantial relationship between legislative purposes
and the statutory means of effectuating those purposes. Such a test may reflect the district court's
decision to employ a form of intermediate scrutiny. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217-18(1982);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). In any case, this formulation reflects the district court's
concern with the validity of both legislative ends and means.
41. 99 N.M. at 718-19, 663 P.2d at 377-78.
42. Id. at 718, 663 P.2d at 377.
43. Id.
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of facts will justify it. 44 Finally, the court suggested that its rational basis
inquiry would end with identification of valid state ends. The Edgington
articulation of the rational basis test implies that once the court identifies
hypothetical state interests that are not patently illegitimate, legislation
touching upon these ends will not be struck down unless there is no
correlation whatsoever between the statute and the identified interests. 45
In effect, the court of appeals' interpretation of the rational basis test
affords virtually no scrutiny of the relationship between the statutory
classification and legitimate legislative goals.
The court of appeals' formulation of the rational basis test allowed it
to ignore the district court's clear concern regarding the attenuated relationship between the home instruction exception and any legitimate
legislative purposes.' The Edgington court also disregarded the United
States Supreme Court's expressed concern that statutory classifications
be truly scrutinized under the rational basis test, in order to ensure that
they further identifiable and valid state ends in a rational manner.47
Moreover, inasmuch as the Edgingtons raised equal protection issues
under both the federal and state constitutions, 8 the court of appeals was
bound by the supremacy clause 49 to apply the federal standard of review.
The Edgington court, however, ignored the United States Supreme Court's
contemporary formulations of the federal rational basis test.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 719, 663 P.2d at 378.
46. See, e.g., Record at 229.
47. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 235 (1981). See also Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448-55 (1972).
Gunther describes the Court's recent attitude toward rational basis scrutiny as follows: "Judicial
deference to a broad range of conceivable legislative purposes and to imaginable facts that might
justify classifications is strikingly diminished. Judicial tolerance of over-inclusive and under-inclusive
classifications is notably reduced. Legislative leeway for unexplained pragmatic experimentations
is substantially narrowed." Gunther, supra note 38, at 20.
The Supreme Court recently demonstrated the contemporary vitality of the realistic rational basis
doctrine in Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982). The Zobel Court invalidated an Alaska statute
on rational basis grounds, finding that the challenged classification did not rationally further two
state interests and did further a third interest that was not legitimate. Id. at 61.
The Zobel test scrutinized challenged legislation in three ways. The test required asserted state
ends to be legitimate, to be furthered by the discriminatory classification, and to be thus furthered
in a reasonable manner. Id. at 60. Within the context of minimal scrutiny, such a standard actively
reviews the constitutional validity of both legislative ends and means. Moreover, the standard assures
that when legislation discriminates against individual rights of a group, it does so in a manner that
is relevant to classifying traits requiring discriminatory treatment in order to achieve a legitimate
purpose for the common good. Id. at 70 (Brennan, J., concurring).
48. 99 N.M. at 718, 663 P.2d at 377.
49. See U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2: "This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."
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3. The Court's State Interest Analysis
Application of its overly deferential rational basis test enabled the
Edgington court to conceive of two state interests to justify the home
instruction exception.5" The court of appeals described the first of these
interests in terms of preventing parents from using home instruction as
a pretense for avoiding consequences of the truancy laws. 5 The court
accepted the plausibility of the Legislature's fear that parents would seize
upon the deregulation of nonpublic schools as an excuse to keep children
out of school altogether, on the grounds that the children were attending
a "private school" at home. 52
The court described its second state interest in terms of assuring the
adequate growth and development of children.53 The court stated that the
Legislature might have adopted the home instruction exception out of a
belief that removal of children from their homes for education 54 was
55
necessary to assure proper intellectual, social, and vocational growth.
The court concluded that its identified interests were legitimate, and
declared that the means for effectuating these interests, embodied in the
home instruction exception, were rationally related to them.
4. The Relationship Between the Home Instruction Exception and
the Identified State Interests
Objective assessment of the means by which the Legislature chose to
further its educational goals56 suggests that in fact the home instruction
exception is not sufficiently related to the ends with which it was associated to survive equal protection scrutiny. The court of appeals correctly
50. 99 N.M. at 719, 663 P.2d at 378. The court correctly placed its analysis within the context
of Santa Fe, which held state supervision and control of nonpublic schools unconstitutional. 85 N.M.
783, 785, 518 P.2d 272, 274 (1974). See also Prince v. Board of Educ., 88 N.M. 548, 543 P.2d
1176 (1975). Prince interprets state control to mean "control over the curriculum, disciplinary
control, financial control, administrative control, and, in general, control over all of the affairs of
the school." Id. at 554, 543 P.2d at 1182. Santa Fe suggests that, while the constitutional grant of
power to the State Board of Education [hereinafter referred to as the Board] did not extend to
nonpublic education, the Legislature's police power might reach nonpublic schools. 85 N.M. at
784, 518 P.2d at 273. Furthermore, an Attorney General's opinion indicates that the Board's authority
over private or public schools is dependent upon legislative enactment. 77 Op. Att'y Gen. 6 (1977).
The New Mexico Legislature has given the Board statutory power only to approve courses of
instruction when requested to do so by a private school. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-2-2(F), (J) (Repl.
Pamp. 1981). The Board's constitutional grant of jurisdiction over nonpublic schools extends solely
to verification of student attendance. See N.M. Const. art. XII; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-2-2(L) (Repl.
Pamp. 1981).
51. 99 N.M. at 719, 663 P.2d at 378.
52. See supra note 25 for a discussion of this issue.
53. 99 N.M. at 719, 663 P.2d at 378.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See supra text accompanying note 47.
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assumed that the opposite of truancy is educational activity, rather than
mere custodial attendance at a location other than a student's home. Yet,
the private school definition, read in conjunction with the Compulsory
School Attendance Act, 57 suggests that custodial presence at an unaccredited private school 8 will fulfill the state's compulsory attendance requirement. Such attendance clearly constitutes no guarantee of education.
At the same time, the home instruction exception precludes a parentally
supervised curriculum, administered at home, from fulfilling the attendance requirement. Such a categorical rejection of home instruction leaves
no room for inquiry as to the quality of the educational experience provided by the parents. In this case, the Edgingtons demonstrated to the
satisfaction of the district court that they were providing their children
with an education that was academically sufficient.5 9 Thus, if the home
instruction exception is not irrelevant to the state's interest in preventing
truancy, it is at least not rationally related to that objective when a further
provision of the Public School Code-satisfied in this case ---adequately
protects the state's interest in ensuring that children actually receive an
education when taught at home.
Moreover, the Compulsory School Attendance Act contains explicit
procedures for preventing truancy.6' These procedures, which basically
include notice and the possibility of adversarial judicial proceedings, are
directly related to verification and elimination of actual incidents of truancy.
The Edgington court presumptively related the flat prohibition of home
instruction to elimination of parentally approved truancy.62 Yet, in contrast
to the state's compulsory attendance provisions, the exception is clearly
attenuated in its relation to assurance of education.
The state's interest in supervision of child development has a similarly
attenuated relationship to removal of children from their homes for edu57. N.M. Stat. Ann. §22-1-2(l) (Repl. Pamp. 1981); id. at § 22-12-2(B) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
58. See supra note 50 for a discussion of this issue.
59. 99 N.M. at 717, 663 P.2d at 376; N.M. Stat. Ann. §22-1-2(S) (Repl. Pamp. 1981). The
district court's finding that the Edgingtons provided their children with a supervised program of
instruction was based on examination of curriculum materials provided to the Edgingtons by the
Christian Liberty Academy, testimony by Mr. and Mrs. Edgington, and production of the children's
pre- and post-test scores on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills. Record at 79-104, 140-42. Test scores
indicated that, during the academic year 1981-82, both Jason and Laura Edgington had gained
between one and three years in each of the academic areas tested. Respondents' Exhibits D, E
(appended to the Record).
60. 99 N.M. at 718, 663 P.2d at 377. The district court found that the Edgington children had
attended a school within the meaning of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-1-2(S) (Repl. Pamp. 1981), namely,
"any supervised program of instruction." This finding reflects the district court's view that the
children had satisfied the state's compulsory attendance requirement. It is questionable, however,
whether the holding of Santa Fe would permit continued application of § 22-1-2(S) to any nonpublic
education, including home instruction. See supra notes 17 and 25.
61. See supra note 8.
62. See supra note 25.
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cational purposes. To the extent that the home instruction exception requires the removal of children from their homes in order to assure them
the opportunity to receive an academically competent education, 63 it stands
in stark contrast to Santa Fe. The Santa Fe decision makes clear that
New Mexico tolerates exposure of children to private educational experiences of both unknown and unregulated quality. In light of the policy
of Santa Fe, the home instruction exception cannot rationally stand on
the asserted state interest in the guarantee of the child's educational
experiences.
Finally, given the state's educational interests in preventing truancy
and supervising child development, the internal structure of the private
school definition is itself arbitrary and unreasonable. The definition directs
the state to remove children from their homes, ostensibly to assure attendance at a "school" where someone other than a parent will verify
their attendance and monitor their academic progress. The private educational environment to which the attendance law permits a child's removal, however, is one over which the state has abrogated all supervision
and control beyond verification of attendance.' The private school definition thus guarantees total state deregulation of all nonpublic education
except parental home instruction, which the state regulates by way of
prohibition.
B. The Home Instruction Exception and the Legislature'sAssumption
The court of appeals correctly interpreted the home instruction exception in light of a legislative assumption of adversity of interest between
parents and children. The court's interpretation, however, raises important
questions as to the origin and legitimacy of that assumption.
The legislative assumption undoubtedly followed the Santa Fe decision
and subsequent recommendations to the Legislature regarding a constitutional approach to nonpublic school law. 65 Santa Fe precluded state
constitutional jurisdiction over nonpublic schools beyond verification of
student attendance.' Yet, the Legislature disregarded the Santa Fe court's
observation that the state could regulate nonpublic education pursuant to
its police power to act for the general welfare of the state's citizens.67
The unexamined implication that any regulation of nonpublic education
was beyond its power led the Legislature to equate private education with
63. See supra note 59.
64. See supra note 50.
65. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
66. Id.
67. The Santa Fe court stated: "However, the Board may exert such authority in the supervision
and control of private schools as is conferred by the legislature in the proper exercise of State police
power." 85 N.M. at 784, 518 P.2d at 273. See also 77 Op. Att'y Gen. 6 (1977).
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unsupervised education. This assumption led in turn to the Legislature's
inference that total deregulation of nonpublic education would induce
some parents to keep children out of school altogether under the pretense
of conducting a "private school" at home.68 Such parental action would
clearly be adverse to the educational interests of those children.
The assumptions culminating in the home instruction exception reflect
a laudable concern with provision for the educational needs of children.
These assumptions are, however, mistaken. As a matter of law and policy,
parents are presumed to act in the best interests of their children.6 9
This presumption is reflected in the policy statement drafted by the
State Department of Public Education's Task Force on Nonpublic Schools,
which views interests of state and parent as acting in a complementary
manner to facilitate the educational interests of the child.7 ° Such a policy
indicates that state, parent, and child act together in making decisions
most appropriate to the achievement of their collateral interests in the
child's education. 7 The adversarial relationship posited by the New Mexico Legislature is thus inconsistent with the policy position articulated by
68. Such an inference was undoubtedly encouraged by the concern of Task Force members with
parentally approved truancy. See supra note 25.
69. Language in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), suggests as follows:
[t]he law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what
a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for
making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized
that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children. . . . The statist notion that governmental power should supercede parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is
repugnant to American tradition.
Id. at 602-03.
70. 99 N.M. at 719, 663 P.2d at 378. The Position Paper defines the relative interests of parent,
child, and state as follows:
State
1. To guarantee to each child the opportunity of obtaining an "education" of
his choice (in a formal sense).
2. To protect children from becoming wards of the State.
3. To encourage the development of self-reliant and responsible citizens.
Parent
I. To supervise the total physical and intellectual development of his child as
he sees fit (emphasis added).
2. To have access to means for accomplishing the first interest.
Child
1. To become self-fulfilled and self-reliant.
2. To have a supportive environment for achieving the first interest.
Position Paper, supra note 25, at 3.
71. See E. S. Mondschein & G. P. Sorenson, Home Instruction In Lieu Of Compulsory Attendance:
Statutory And Constitutional Issues (Nov. 1982) (paper presented at the national convention of the
National Organization on Legal Problems and Education). The authors read relevant Supreme Court
decisions, coupled with common law doctrine, as supporting the proposition that "parents and the
state have shared rights and responsibilities with regard to the education of children, and that within
reasonable state guidelines, the parents may select the educational alternative that meets their needs."
Id. at 12.
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the Task Force, as well as with the legal presumption of unity of interests
among parent, child, and state. 72 By upholding the home instruction
exception, the court of appeals tacitly approved the Legislature's incorrect
assumption regarding adversity of educational interests as between parent
and child.
IV. CONCLUSION
State v. Edgington commends the Legislature to a more careful reading
of Santa Fe and its suggestion that the state exercise its inherent police
power to regulate nonpublic education. Such an exercise would serve two
useful functions. Minimal regulation of nonpublic education would ensure
that all educational programs in fact afford children an adequate education.
Moreover, statutory permission of parental home instruction, accompanied by state regulation parallel to that of private schools,73 would
abrogate the contradictory effects of the current private school definition
and further the educational interests of all children, as well as those of
their parents and the state.
NANCY SCANLAN NEARY

72. See Stocklin-Enright, The Constitutionality Of Home Education: The Role Of The Parent,
The State And The Child, 18 Willamette L. Rev. 563, 578 (1982). In regard to the presumption that
parents act in their children's best interests, Stocklin-Enright argues (a) that the state has a surveillance
interest in ensuring that parents act to meet their child's educational needs and that (b) this interest
is secondary to the parents' interest in facilitating their child's educational interests. Stocklin-Enright
also posits viewing the tripartite allocation of educational interests according to a trust model of
decision-making, whereby parents and state act, in effect, as trustees of the body of children's rights
and interests which constitutes the corpus of the trust. Id. at 584-86.
73. See Mondschein & Sorenson, supra note 71, at 4, who stated in November 1982 that 26
states permit some form of home instruction. The authors list the following as criteria a state may
wish to consider when evaluating the adequacy of a home instruction program: (a) hours of instruction
equivalent to those required by public schools, (b) the competence, diligence, and good faith of
parties instructing the children, (c) adequacy of materials, texts, methods, and procedures, and (d)
periodic state testing of the children enrolled in home instruction programs to monitor educational
progress and ensure that minimal educational standards are being maintained. This list is cited in
the Massachusetts case of Perchemlides v. Frizzle, No. 16641, slip op. at 28 (Hampshire, Mass.
Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 1978).

